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VOLUME IX 1992 NUMBER 2
CONVICTION WITHOUT IMPOSITION: A
RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR GREENAWALT
Samuel W. Calhoun*
I. INTRODUCTION
For some time Professor Kent Greenawalt has been struggling
with the tough issue of when those with religious convictions may
"properly rely on [them] in deciding what public laws and policies to
support."' Professor Greenawalt's thesis is that individuals must re-
solve many public policy questions for which "publicly accessible rea-
sons" provide an insufficient solution.2 Each person is therefore
* Professor of Law, Washington & Lee University School of Law. This article was
made possible in part by a grant from the Frances Lewis Law Center. I am deeply appreciative
of the help of many people: Randy Bezanson, Bryan Bishop, Alan Button, Jackie Calhoun,
Paul Carter, Bob Cochran, Bill Geimer, Kent Greenawalt, Roger Groot, Gwen Handelman,
Lyman Johnson, Rick Kirgis, Lash LaRue, Warren Lehman, Uncas McThenia, Ted Melton,
David Millon, Brian Murchison, Steve Patterson, Ronnie Range, George Reede, Tom Shaffer,
Jim Sloat and Joe Ulrich. I owe a special debt of gratitude to Mark Grunewald, who during all
of the phases of this project gave generously of his time and wisdom.
1. Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MICH. L. REV. 352, 353
(1985). After the Michigan article, Professor Greenawalt continued to explore the issue in
Religiously Based Premises and Laws Restrictive of Liberty, 1986 B.Y.U. L. REV. 245; Natural
Law and Political Choice: The General Justification Defense - Criteria for Political Action and
the Duty to Obey the Law, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 1, 27-36 (1986); Church-State Relations and
Religious Convictions, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 219 (1986-87); and The Limits of Rationality and
the Place of Religious Conviction: Protecting Animals in the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1011 (1986). The most complete statement of his thinking appears in K. GREENAWALT,
RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE (1988). See also Greenawalt, Religious
Convictions and Political Choice: Some Further Thoughts, 39 DE PAUL L. REV. 1019 (1990).
2. K. GREENAWALT, RELIGIOUS CONVICTIONS AND POLITICAL CHOICE 144-49
(1988). Although he expresses some misgivings, by "publicly accessible reasons" Professor
Greenawalt means "secular rational grounds: secular not in the sense of being antireligious
but in the sense of not relying on religious assumptions, rational in the sense of resting on
reasoned arguments whose force is generally understood." Id. at 56-57.
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forced to resort to "personal experiences and commitments of value
.... " Since "everyone must inevitably use 'nonpublic' reasons...
people whose experience leads them to religious convictions should
not have to disregard what they consider the critical insights about
value that their convictions provide."4
I admire Professor Greenawalt's work greatly and find in it much
with which I agree. In two important respects, however, I differ. The
first is a matter of perspective. Professor Greenawalt's goal is to de-
termine when a good member of our liberal democracy would rely on
his or her religious convictions.' My goal is to determine when an
obedient Christian would do so. Our difference in approach is best
shown by Professor Greenawalt's comments concerning one of his il-
lustrations, Jody. Jody believes that God both "considers the drink-
ing of alcohol to be sinful" and "wishes that organized societies stamp
out this practice . ".. 6 Professor Greenawalt believes that Jody, in
seeking laws against the drinking of alcohol, would not be acting like
a good, liberal democratic citizen.7 He also thinks, however, that
Jody's desire for such laws "makes perfect sense if she has correctly
conceived religious truth."' The question which Professor Greena-
wait's work intentionally avoids is whether Jody's belief that God
wants societies to use law to stamp out sin reflects an accurate view of
God.9 This is the issue with which I am chiefly concerned. My con-
clusion, which assumes the existence of the Christian God, is that
Jody is wrong.
I also differ from Professor Greenawalt with respect to the cir-
cumstances in which one may properly rely upon one's religious faith
in determining whether or not to support a particular law. Professor
Greenawalt believes that whenever a choice is to be made between
two rationally plausible views, the individual may properly ground his
selection upon religious convictions.10 This is appropriate even if the
3. Id. at 145.
4. Id. at 144-45.
5. Id. at 4.
6. Id. at 55.
7. Id. at 55-56. Professor Greenawalt does not explicitly state this conclusion. Indeed,
he appears to attribute it to the theory of proper citizen conduct that his book criticizes.
Nonetheless, I am convinced that Professor Greenawalt himself would view Jody's conduct as
inconsistent with good liberal democratic behavior. See infra note 11.
8. Id. at 55.
9. See id. Professor Greenawalt states that in his approach to such questions he tries
"hard to avoid direct claims about theological truth." Id. at 4. His "analysis and conclusions
*.. do not depend on the truth or falsity of particular religious positions ...." Id. at 5.
10. Professor Greenawalt does not believe that the good citizen should seek to use law to
implement faith-based views "that would be senseless given any rational secular assessment of
[Vol. 9
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person of faith concludes that the rational arguments favoring his
faith-based view are weaker than those on the other side.' I would
tell the Christian in this situation to forego seeking any law that
would compel compliance with a faith-based precept. 12 I believe that
the Christian faith itself requires such forbearance.
My goal in this article will be to explain the two conclusions that
the facts." Id. at 204. There thus is a threshold requirement of rational plausibility. Id. at
207.
11. See id. at 166-67. Professor Greenawalt believes that this choice would be appropriate
for two broad categories of issues: borderline questions of status and complex factual judg-
ments. The former category involves disputes about "how much protection, if any, particular
entities are thought to warrant." Id. at 98. Professor Greenawalt discusses animal rights,
environmental ethics and abortion; he concludes that the good liberal democrat may properly
ground his public policy choices in his religious convictions despite the absence of indepen-
dently-compelling secular justification. See id. at 166-67. Professor Greenawalt reaches the
same conclusion for his second category, wherein he discusses the tough choices to be made
concerning the issues of welfare assistance, punishment and military policy. See id. at 173-76,
192.
In contrast to the foregoing two categories, Professor Greenawalt believes that there is
one situation in which independently-compelling secular justification is required if the person
of faith is to act like a good liberal democrat. A good liberal citizen should never seek laws to
prevent "a wrong judged purely from a religious perspective ...." Id. at 94. Professor Green-
awalt's example involves Sam, who must decide whether to seek a criminal prohibition of
homosexual conduct among consenting adults. Id. at 90. After evaluating the arguments that
rest on commonly accessible reasons, Sam concludes that "the arguments against [prohibition]
... are far stronger than the arguments in favor of prohibition ...." Id. He, however, "also
believes that homosexual acts are sins that God wants stopped." Id. Professor Greenawalt
believes that if Sam seeks a prohibition due to "the possible sinfulness of sexual activities," he
would not be acting as a good liberal democrat. See id. at 91. This would be true even if the
secular arguments tipped "only weakly against prohibition." Id. Only if a person were hon-
estly convinced that the secular arguments for a prohibition outweighed those against would
support of a criminal law be consistent "with the proper conception of liberal democracy." Id.
at 94.
As will become apparent, the faith-based non-imposition standard which I would impose
in all situations upon the obedient Christian is essentially identical to the foregoing "good
liberal democrat" standard which Professor Greenawalt would apply only when the religious
person is seeking to prohibit acts solely because his faith compels him to view them as morally
wrong. I am not persuaded that borderline questions of status or complex factual judgments
warrant any different treatment. See infra notes 107 and 156.
12. Not every faith-based vote contrary to the weight of rational argument would be inap-
propriate for the Christian. In one of his preliminary articles, Professor Greenawalt uses the
illustration of Joseph, who is persuaded "very weakly" by rational arguments "that human
beings should not eat the flesh of higher animals, and that the law should prohibit the produc-
tion and processing of meat for that purpose." The Limits of Rationality and the Place of
Religious Conviction: Protecting Animals and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1011, 1061 (1986). Joseph, however, also believes that the Bible "clearly establishes the moral
permissibility of eating meat." Id. Professor Greenawalt concludes that it would be entirely
appropriate for Joseph to follow his firm religious convictions rather than "uncompelling ra-
tional arguments." Id. Although the sentence that accompanies this footnote would seem
necessarily to imply that I would disagree with Professor Greenawalt's conclusion were Joseph
a Christian, the fact is that I would agree with him on these particular facts. A faith-based
vote by Joseph not to prohibit the production of meat does not compel anyone to do anything.
Rather, it leaves matters in a state of freedom.
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I express above. I will do so by articulating a faith-based principle,
which I call the non-imposition principle, for evaluating when it is
appropriate for one holding faith-based normative propositions to
seek their enactment into law. I will then defend the non-imposition
principle against several anticipated criticisms.
II. THE NON-IMPOSITION PRINCIPLE
I am a Christian. I believe in God as described in the Bible: "the
Creator of the ends of the earth";1 3 "righteous in all His ways";' 4
"gracious and compassionate, slow to anger and rich in love"; 5 "ma-
jestic in holiness, awesome in glory, working wonders";' 6 "mighty in
power"; 7 limitless in His understanding;' 8 "the blessed and only
Ruler, the King of kings and Lord of lords, who alone is immortal
and who lives in unapproachable light.' 9 I also believe the Bible to
be "God-breathed," 2 that is, "given by inspiration of God."2  I
would therefore agree with the Psalmist David that the Bible's norma-
tive propositions are "perfect," "trustworthy" and "altogether right-
eous."22 In sum, I believe that an infinite, infallible God has spoken
through the Bible in normative propositions that we can understand.
The question then becomes whether I should urge that Biblical princi-
ples be enacted into law.23
In view of my beliefs, the answer initially might seem to be sim-
ple. After all, if an infallible God in fact has spoken, surely His pro-
nouncements should be law. The reality is, however, that I would
oppose any legal sanction being given to a Biblical command based
solely on the command's presence in the Bible. There is, of course, a







19. 1 Tim. 6:15-16.
20. 2 Tim. 3:16.
21. The Westminster Confession of Faith, ch. 1, II, printed in THE WESTMINSTER
STANDARDS 4 (Great Commission Publications).
22. Ps. 19:7, 9.
23. My thinking on this topic was sparked some years ago by the late Arthur Leff's arti-
cle, Unspeakable Ethics, Unnatural Law, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1229. Leff's thesis is that apart from
God there is no non-arbitrary grounding for a normative proposition. Since Leff, however,
assumed the absence of God, he did not explore the implications for law should God exist.
[Vol. 9
HeinOnline  -- 9 J. L. & Religion 292 1991-1992
CONVICTION WITHOUT IMPOSITION
liefs. While most Americans profess to believe in God,2 4 fewer ac-
tively endeavor to conform their concept of God to the God revealed
in the Scriptures. For those who do rely on the Bible, opinions differ
on how to interpret Biblical principles. If a particular lawmaking
body today happens to agree with me, nothing guarantees that a dif-
ferent body will not disagree. As Governor Mario Cuomo aptly said
in his noted 1984 speech at Notre Dame, "[w]e know that the price of
seeking to force our beliefs on others is that they might some day
force theirs on us.
' 25
This practical argument, however valid, is not what chiefly moti-
vates me. I refrain from using law to force my religious beliefs on
others, not because I am afraid that the tables might be turned some-
day, but because I view any attempt to impose my faith as fundamen-
tally incompatible with Christianity. For those surprised that an
evangelical Christian can believe as I do, it is important to emphasize
that people who held similar religious views played a substantial role
in establishing the religious liberty that we enjoy today. The most
compelling example occurred in Revolutionary Virginia, where in the
decade between 1776 and 1786 there was spirited debate concerning
the proper relationship between church and state. After describing
these Virginia antecedents for the non-imposition principle, I will de-
fine the principle more explicitly by giving my view of its scope.26 I
will conclude Part II by explaining why the non-imposition principle
is an integral part of the Christian faith.
A. Virginia Antecedents for the Non-Imposition Principle
The church-state debate in Revolutionary Virginia, the outcome
of which was significant in influencing the approach the nation itself
would adopt,27 had its beginnings prior to 1776. By then various dis-
senting religious groups had already begun protesting against the spe-
cial position of the Church of England,28 the established church in
24. In 1986, 94 percent said they believed in "God or a Supreme Being." Washington
Post, Dec. 14, 1989, at A35, col.5. See K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 218-19.
25. Cuomo, Religious Belief and Public Morality: A Catholic Governor's Perspective, 1
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 13, 16 (1984).
26. Those two subparts will reveal that I consider the scope of the non-imposition princi-
ple to be broader than its Virginia antecedents. The more narrow concept of non-imposition
which prevailed in Virginia still is properly called an "antecedent" because I believe my posi-
tion reflects its logical extension.
27. W. MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 43-44
(1986); T. BUCKLEY, CHURCH AND STATE IN REVOLUTIONARY VIRGINIA 6-7 (1977).
28. W. MILLER, supra note 27, at 7.
289]
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Virginia from the beginning of the colony.2 9 The debate intensified
significantly following the June 1776 passage of the Virginia Declara-
tion of Rights, which in Article 16 declared that "all men are equally
entitled to the free exercise of religion ... ."30 Professor William
Miller states that this clause produced an "embarrassing enthusiasm"
among evangelical Christians.31 Lawmakers that Fall were inundated
by petitions from Lutherans, Baptists and Presbyterians arguing for
"the end of the established church and the equality of all religions
"32 "[T]he longest and most carefully worded petition was sub-
mitted by the Hanover Presbytery,"33 which Professor Miller calls "in
social position much the strongest of the dissenters .... "3 While
other reasons were given, the petition asserted a religious objection to
ecclesiastical establishments (including one for itself): the Gospel
does not need "civil aid," as Christ's "weapons are spiritual, and were
only designed to have influence on the judgment and heart of man
",35
While this outcry by the evangelicals did not lead to disestablish-
ment of the Anglicans, it did produce a law exempting the dissenters
from any contributions or taxes to support them.36 The 1776 session
was also significant in that there first appeared the idea that would be
at the center of debate for the next ten years-"[t]he concept of a
general assessment, of taxing everyone for the church or minister of
his choice . . . ." The gist of the argument favoring assessment is
revealed in the opening words of the 1784 bill which proposed the
measure: "Whereas the general diffusion of Christian knowledge hath
a natural tendency to correct the morals of men, restrain their vices,
and preserve the peace of society .... ",38 Advocates of assessment
believed that public virtue was a prerequisite to effective self-govern-
29. See T. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 8.
30. Id. at 17-19.
31. W. MILLER, supra note 27, at 7.
32. Id.
33. T. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 26.
34. W. MILLER, supra note 27, at 29-30. It is interesting to note that quite a battle has
been waged over the years between the Presbyterians and the Baptists concerning which de-
nomination played the more significant role in the fight for religious liberty in Virginia. See C.
JAMES, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE STRUGGLE FOR RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN VIRGINIA
(1971). As one who was raised a Baptist and is now a Presbyterian, I am glad that I can be
proud of the efforts of both groups.
35. Presbyterian Memorial of October 24, 1776, reprinted in C. JAMES, supra note 34, at
222, 224.
36. T. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 34-35.
37. Id. at 35.
38. Id. at 188.
[Vol. 9
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ment and that religion was a prerequisite to public virtue. It therefore
behooved the state to encourage and support religion.39 This view
temporarily swayed the Hanover Presbytery to favor assessment, a
"severe jolt to the anti-assessment forces."'' 4 In an October 1784 me-
morial to the Assembly, the Presbyterians argued that "the existence
and welfare of every political combination of men in society" is abso-
lutely dependent upon the support given by religion, with "its happy
influence upon.., morality" and "its tendency to preserve the vener-
ation of an oath ... which is the cement of the social union."41
The assessment controversy culminated in the Fall of 1785, when
a "tidal wave of religious petitions" opposing a general assessment
"engulfed the Assembly."42 The petition with the most signatures-
about 5,000-was penned by an anonymous author whose chief objec-
tion to assessment was that it was "contrary to the 'spirit of the gos-
pel' . . . . As in 1776, however, the most significant petition came
from the Hanover Presbytery,"4 which had reversed its position of
nine months before.4 5 While the Presbyterians still acknowledged
religion's beneficial influence upon morality (and hence its essential
contribution to democratic government), they now argued that Chris-
tianity best could accomplish this result "when left to its native excel-
lence and evidence to recommend it, under the all-directing
providence of God, and free from the intrusive hand of the civil mag-
istrate."'46 Whenever the civil powers had tried to assist Christianity,
either by the "sanction of legal terrors" or by "honors and rewards,"
the result had been "corruption" and the destruction of "genuine mo-
rality. ' 47 A general assessment would not lead the citizenry to cher-
39. See W. MILLER, supra note 27, at 24-29.
40. T. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 92.
41. Presbyterian Memorial of October 1784, reprinted in C. JAMES, supra note 34, at 231,
234. See W. MILLER, supra note 27, at 29-30. In addition to promoting virtue through reli-
gion, an assessment was also viewed as a way to relieve the financial woes of the Presbyterian
clergy. See T. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 92-93.
42. T. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 144-45.
43. W. MILLER, supra note 27, at 39; T. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 148-49.
44. See W. MILLER, supra note 27, at 40; T. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 175.
45. T. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 136-37. This reversal reflected the victory of the views
of William Graham, the leader of the anti-assessment group within the Presbytery. See id. at
93-94. Graham was the president of Liberty Hall College, a predecessor institution to my
present employer, Washington and Lee University. Id. at 93. It is probable that Graham
drafted the Presbytery's petition to the Assembly. See id. at 139 n.56; E. CRAWFORD, AN
ENDLESS LINE OF SPLENDOR: PROFILES OF SIX PIONEER PRESBYTERIAN PREACHER-EDU-
CATORS 33 (1983); C. JAMES, supra note 34, at 137.
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ish either religion or morality, both of which could be "promoted only
by the internal conviction of the mind and its voluntary choice
"48 The Presbyterian petition ended by urging the adoption of
Thomas Jefferson's bill establishing religious freedom,49 which had
first been introduced in 1779.50 This statute was in fact enacted early
in 1786;51 it prohibited compulsory support for religion and molesta-
tion in body or goods on account of one's beliefs, while affirming the
freedom of all men to profess religious opinions without fear of civil
disability. 52
I do not by any means intend to imply that the faith-based argu-
ments of Christian evangelicals 3 were the sole reason for the defeat of
general assessment and passage of Jefferson's statute. 54 Jefferson, as
draftsman, was obviously a factor, but during the legislative battle he
was in Paris as Minister to France." James Madison played a crucial
role. He provided political leadership during the struggle56 and also
made a substantial ideological contribution as the author of the "Me-
morial and Remonstrance" against the assessment bill.7 This docu-
ment had as its intellectual foundation the "philosophy of natural
rights, '5 8 the notion that the domain of "'conviction and con-
science' "is by nature beyond the proper jurisdiction of civil society.59
While Madison was important, history is distorted to the extent that
48. Id. at 237-38. These arguments provide contrary evidence to one scholar's contention
that the Presbyterian petition was confined "largely to rational, secular arguments and to the
language of natural religion, rather than employing a rhetoric that invoked Scriptural revela-
tion and the powers of divine grace." Isaac, "The Rage of Malice of the Old Serpent Devil":
The Dissenters and the Making and Remaking of the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom, in
THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 139, 150 (M. Peterson & R. Vaughan,
eds. 1988).
49. Presbyterian Memorial of August 1785, reprinted in C. JAMES, supra note 34, at 236,
240.
50. T. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 46.
51. Id. at 163.
52. Id. at 191.
53. Not all of the evangelicals' motivations were as pure as their faith-based arguments.
The Presbyterians, for example, abandoned their earlier support of assessment in part due to
fears that assessment would most help the Episcopalians. W. MILLER, supra note 27, at 40-41,
113; T. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 137-38.
54. Economic conditions also played a part. The people, who had already complained
about high taxes, were experiencing such financial difficulties that a new tax to support religion
would have been very unpopular. See T. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 153-55; Isaac, supra note
48, at 146-47.
55. W. MILLER, supra note 27, at 34; T. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 174.
56. T. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 174.
57. Id.
58. W. MILLER, supra note 27, at 99.
59. Id. at 101; see T. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 131.
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his Enlightenment perspective6° is touted as the chief font of religious
liberty in America.61 According to Professor Thomas Buckley, the
key to understanding the nature of the religious settlement in Vir-
ginia rests with the dissenters, the members of the evangelical
churches, for they wrote and signed the overwhelming majority of
the memorials which engulfed the legislature that year; and their
representatives provided the votes in the Assembly which deter-
mined the outcome. Had the evangelicals, and particularly the
Presbyterians, opted for the assessment bill, Virginia would have
had a multiple establishment of religion instead of Jefferson's bill.62
While it would be historically inaccurate to downplay the role of
evangelical Christians in establishing religious liberty, it would also be
a distortion to fail to mention another evangelical cause which shows
that they may not have realized the full implications of the arguments
they had made in their fight against assessment. I refer to their simul-
taneous call "for laws designed to enforce a style of public morality
and life dictated by and expressive of their own particular religious
60. It would be inaccurate to portray Madison as solely influenced by the Enlightenment.
His Memorial and Remonstrance, for example, included religious arguments against assess-
ment similar to those of the evangelicals (in turn, the evangelical petitions included arguments
based on natural rights). See T. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 131, 179-80. Nonetheless, Profes-
sor Miller argues that Madison, who kept "a certain cool distance from all those 'sects,' " was
perhaps "as much a man of the Enlightenment" as was Jefferson. W. MILLER, supra note 27,
at 236. Contra Berman, Religion and Law: The First Amendment in Historical Perspective, 35
EMORY L.J. 777, 784-87 (1986).
61. Mark DeWolfe Howe argues that the United States Supreme Court has committed
precisely this error in its interpretation of the history of the first amendment's establishment
clause. See M. HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 1-19 (1965). The error is re-
vealed by the Court's premising a rule of constitutional law in Jefferson's metaphor that the
first amendment was intended to build "a wall of separation between church and state." See
id. at 1. Howe believes that by focusing on Jefferson's phrase, the Court conveys the inaccu-
rate idea that the establishment clause has its chief roots in "enlightened rationalism," with a
people who shared Jefferson's "deep anxiety that the liberties of individuals would be endan-
gered if a wall of separation did not stand between [churches] and the state." See id. at 6-9.
The truth, Howe posits, is that the origin of the clause owes more to "a theological theory of
disestablishment" than to "the bias of eighteenth-century rationalism." See id. at 9, 2. Accord-
ing to this theology, it is the church which needs protection from the government, for "a
church dependent on governmental favor cannot be true to its better self." See id. at 7-8. The
first amendment therefore primarily reflects not Jeffersonian fears, "but rather the evangelical
hope that private conscience and autonomous churches, working together and in freedom,
would extend the rule of truth." Id. at 19.
Howe's conclusion concerning the critical role of religious arguments in the history of the
establishment clause finds strong collateral support in the defeat of general assessment in Vir-
ginia. I must agree with Howe that religious liberty in the United States is in large part based
upon the fact that people of faith, for faith-based reasons, eschewed the grasp for governmental
favor which they might have made.
62. T. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 175. See id. at 143, 164; W. MILLER, supra note 27, at
39, 52-53, 153, 235.
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beliefs."6 An example is a law compelling, through imposition of a
fine for noncompliance, the observance of Sunday as a day of rest,
which was enacted by the same Virginia Assembly that passed Jeffer-
son's statute." One well might ask how evangelicals who believed on
faith-based grounds that Christianity should not be armed with the
"sanction of legal terrors"65 could have supported such a law. The
inconsistency seems jarring;66 it has also been a recurring one in
American history. Professor Miller, in describing nineteenth-century
Protestantism, writes that a large part of that movement
evidently saw no contradiction to the religious freedom, the Volun-
tary Way in religion, the separation of church and state that it
overwhelmingly and explicitly and even proudly endorsed-re-
garding itself as a chief bearer and embodiment of that ideal-in
the legal requirement that the Sabbath be observed by everybody
on Sunday, that all children in the public schools be required to
hear Protestant versions of the Lord's Prayer and be read to out of
the King James Bible, and much more.6 7
I do see the contradiction and would not support any law that I
would view as an effort to impose my faith on others. The key is to
determine what "imposing one's faith" means.
B. The Scope of the Non-Imposition Principle
To begin the discussion of the non-imposition principle, it is use-
ful to introduce the thinking of two men in whose tradition, like that
of the Presbyterian dissenters in Virginia, I stand: Roger Williams
and John Leland. Both endorsed "religious liberty not on grounds of
rationalism, indifference, or expediency, nor exclusively of republican
government, but on grounds of affirmative religious belief .... "6
Professor Miller describes Roger Williams as our nation's "first
63. T. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 181.
64. Id.; W. MILLER, supra note 27, at 49. Imposition of a fine could be thought of as a
liberalization of Virginia's laws on the subject, as during earlier times failure to keep the Sab-
bath resulted in whipping. E. CRAWFORD, supra note 45, at 30.
65. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
66. The Supreme Court, in McGowan v. State of Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961), dis-
agrees. McGowan, which upheld the constitutionality of Sunday "Blue Laws," considered very
influential the history of the struggle for religious liberty in Virginia. In commenting on the
relationship of the Virginia Assembly's passage of the Sunday labor prohibition to its passage
of Jefferson's Statute for Establishing Religious Freedom, the Court suggested that the Assem-
bly's passage of both statutes showed that the former must not have been thought to be incon-
sistent with the latter. Id. at 437-39. To think, however, that one is acting consistently does
not guarantee that one is. See infra note 150 and accompanying text.
67. W. MILLER, supra note 27, at 232.
68. Id. at 153-54.
[Vol. 9
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real hero of religious liberty."6 9 Williams, founder of Rhode Island in
1636,70 was "an intense partisan," holding "orthodox Puritan Chris-
tian beliefs ... ."I' He condemned the Catholic Church and the
Church of England, and, in addition, "felt strongly about the defects
of many sorts-most or all sorts--of his fellow Puritans." '72 He none-
theless insisted on "soul freedom" for all his opponents.73 In such
works as The Bloudy [Bloody] Tenent [Tenet], of Persecution, for
Cause of Conscience, Williams promulgated his belief that it was a
"pernicious evil" to persecute or coerce anybody because of the per-
son's religious beliefs. 74 The even more striking thing about Williams
is that, in an age when "partisanship led to... persecution," he acted
consistently with his beliefs.75 Quakers, some of whom were hanged
in Massachusetts, were welcome in Rhode Island.76 The colony also
was a haven for Jews.77
John Leland, while not nearly as well-known as Williams, is de-
scribed by Professor Miller as one of several "dissenting clergymen
who struck mighty blows in the battles for religious liberty .... 78
Although raised in Massachusetts, Leland began his ministry in Vir-
ginia, where he was a popular Baptist preacher during the years of the
fight over general assessment. He undoubtedly played a part in for-
mulating Baptist opposition to that proposal, but the extent of his
involvement is unclear. 79 It is certain, though, that Leland had a pri-
mary role in the successful effort to obtain repeal of the Incorporation
Act, which had given the Episcopal Church a privileged position. 0
Leland also made a significant contribution to ratification of the Con-
stitution and enactment of the Bill of Rights. He initially opposed
ratification, chiefly because the proposed Constitution did not suffi-
ciently secure religious liberty. Leland changed his mind, however,
and directed his substantial following accordingly, after a celebrated
meeting with Madison at which Madison gave assurances that amend-
69. Id. at 154.
70. See S. BROCKUMIER, THE IRREPRESSIBLE DEMOCRAT 82-90 (1940).
71. W. MILLER, supra note 27, at 175.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 171-72.
75. Id. at 175.
76. Id. at 191-93.
77. Id. at 193-95.
78. Id. at 154.
79. See Butterfield, Elder John Leland, Jeffersonian Itinerant, 62 AM. ANTIQUARIAN
SOC'Y PROC. 155, 167-77 (1952).
80. Id. at 177-78.
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ments to secure essential rights would soon be added.I Leland re-
turned to New England in 1790, where he continued his fight for
religious freedom by publishing numerous tracts and addresses at-
tacking a variety of perceived infringements: the established Congre-
gational church;82  the provision in the 1780 Massachusetts
Constitutional establishing a general assessment scheme very similar
to the one defeated in Virginia; 3 laws enforcing observance of the
Sabbath; 4 and government compensation of Congressional chap-
lains.85 Leland was still active in the struggle as late as his seventy-
fifth year, with his opposition to the campaign to persuade Congress
to prohibit the carrying of the mails on Sunday.8 6
What, to Roger Williams, would have constituted an imposition
of one's faith in violation of his principle of "soul freedom"? For Wil-
liams, "liberty of conscience meant ... that no man should be pre-
vented from worshipping as his conscience directed him," and also
"that no man should be compelled to worship against his conscience
or to contribute to the support of a worship his conscience disap-
proved.8s7 Williams, though, would not countenance all forms of
worship. Human sacrifice and temple prostitution, for example, could
be justifiably prohibited by the state, which had a duty "to punish
anyone whose conscience led him to undertake actions against the
public safety and welfare."'88  Williams' concepts both of "actions"
and of "public safety and welfare" were broad. Chastity, for example,
was properly encouraged by censorship of books (those that were
" 'wanton,' 'immodest,' and 'unclean' ") and by proscriptions con-
cerning dress. The state even had the duty to ensure that men kept
their hair at the proper length. 9
John Leland's basic views were similar to Williams' views. A
person's religion or lack of it was not a matter of state concern:
"where conscience begins, empire ceases. '"90 The state, though, has a
duty to preserve the "lives, liberties and property" of its citizens. 91 It
81. Id. at 183-92. See C. JAMES, supra note 34, at 154-58.
82. Butterfield, surpa note 79, at 197-201.
83. Id. at 207-10.
84. Id. at 236.
85. THE WRITINGS OF JOHN LELAND 293-94 (L. Greene ed. 1969) (hereinafter cited as
WRITINGS).
86. Butterfield, supra note 79, at 236-40.
87. E. MORGAN, ROGER WILLIAMS: THE CHURCH AND THE STATE 137 (1967).
88. Id. at 134; see W. MILLER, supra note 27, at 185-86.
89. E. MORGAN, supra note 87, at 134-35; W. MILLER, supra note 27, at 185-86.
90. WRITINGS, supra note 85, at 221, 488.
91. Id. at 238.
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is difficult to know whether Leland would have agreed with Williams
as to the breadth of activities that should be viewed as jeopardizing
these interests, thereby justifying state intervention. Some of Leland's
words seemingly bespeak a more limited role for the state: it should
punish for assaults against life, liberty or property92 and "overt acts"
of violence. 93 Other phrases are susceptible to a broader interpreta-
tion: the law can punish those who work "ill toward their neigh-
bors" 94 and those who disturb "peace and good order."
What help do Williams and Leland provide to one today who
tries to discover the line between those situations where legal compul-
sion would violate the principle of non-imposition and those where it
would not? Their views appear roughly to establish the line between
belief on the one hand and actions on the other. Compulsion of beliefs
is prohibited, whereas actions may be regulated for the public good.
This dichotomy is a familiar one, now probably viewed primarily as a
Jeffersonian concept. 96 The proposition that belief should not be co-
erced is enormously important, something that we now perhaps take
for granted in the United States. I would disagree, however, with
Williams and Leland to the extent that they may be understood as
confining the non-imposition principle to the category of belief. It is
too simplistic to say that one avoids imposing one's faith merely by
avoiding coercion of another in his beliefs. Imposition of faith can
also occur through coercion of another's actions. Assume, for exam-
ple, a proposed law to criminalize consensual, heterosexual cohabita-
tion between unmarried adults. I know in my heart that the only
reason that would prompt me even to consider supporting such a law
is God's condemnation of sexual activity outside of marriage, 97 i.e.,
the secular arguments that might be made for the proposal98 do not
independently convince me of its desirability. Since my faith-based
92. Id. at 276, 444.
93. Id. at 184, 443.
94. Id. at 118, 488.
95. Id. at 228.
96. Two of the most famous formulations of the dichotomy are Jefferson's. The earlier
appears in his Virginia Statute for Establishing Religious Freedom: "it is time enough for the
rightful purposes of civil government for its officers to interfere when principles break out into
overt acts against peace and good order." W. MILLER, supra note 27, at 358. The second is in
Jefferson's Notes on the State of Virginia: "The legitimate powers of government extend to
such acts only as are injurious to others. But it does me no injury for my neighbor to say there
are twenty gods, or no God. It neither picks my pocket nor breaks my leg." T. JEFFERSON,
NOTES ON THE STATE OF VIRGINIA 152 (Harper Torchbook edition, 1964).
97. See, e.g., 1 Corin. 6:12-7:9; 1 Thes. 4:3-8; Hebr. 13:4.
98. The possible arguments include: (1) prevention of disease; (2) reduction in unwanted
pregnancies, thereby reducing the number of abortions and/or the number of children being
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view of reality would be the determinative reason for seeking to force
others to comply, I cannot escape the conclusion that a vote for the
law would be a vote to impose my faith.99
The non-imposition standard as I view it, therefore, is personal
and subjective. Applying it requires a prayerful heart search by each
Christian to evaluate the relative weight of his reasons for seeking
laws that implement faith-based precepts. Only if secular reasons,
standing alone,"° justify his support can the Christian do so without
imposing his faith.101
raised in single-parent households; and (3) promotion and protection of the institution of
marriage.
99. Cf K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 247 (discussed in the context of a possible
establishment clause violation). As I have indicated earlier, Professor Greenawalt would con-
clude that such a vote also would violate the standard of good citizenship in a liberal democ-
racy. See the Sam illustration, supra note 11.
100. I am aware that in positing a legal system which would be based solely upon secular
reasons that I collide with Professor Leff's thesis that such a system-in the assumed absence
of God-would inevitably be arbitrary. See supra note 23. Professor David Smolin agrees
with Leff as to the effect upon a legal system of excluding God: such a system would be
"inherently tyrannical." See Smolin, The Judeo-Christian Tradition and Self-Censorship in
Legal Discourse, 13 U. DAYTON L. REV. 345, 345-47 (1988). He argues that the only way to
avoid tyranny is to base the system upon the objective norms of the Judeo-Christian tradition.
See id. at 360-62. (Professor Smolin acknowledges, however, that not all Scriptural norms
should be enforced through law. Id. at 367. Identifying those that should, a task which Pro-
fessor Smolin left "for another day," would require developing a methodology defined "in
terms of what the Judeo-Christian tradition itself says about the use, nature, and function of
law .... " Id. Professor Smolin later articulated such a methodology in Smolin, The Enforce-
ment of Natural Law by the State: A Response to Professor Calhoun, 16 U. DAYTON L. REV.
381 (1991). The faith-based non-imposition principle is the result of my own thinking on this
subject.
This article is not the place to evaluate the conclusions of Professors Leff and Smolin
concerning the arbitrariness/tyranny of a legal system which excludes God. If they are cor-
rect, there is an obvious tension between their views and the non-imposition principle: the
only way to avoid arbitrariness and tyranny is to make a legal system God-based, but to do so
constitutes an imposition of faith contrary to what the faith permits. I begin to explore these
matters in Calhoun, Misreading the Judeo-Christian Tradition and the Law: A Response to
Professor Smolin, 15 U. DAYTON L. REV. 383 (1990).
101. The subjectivity of the non-imposition principle means that any resort to state force by
a Christian conceivably could constitute an imposition of faith. Suppose, for example, that a
Christian works for laws to punish murder. Because of the secular reasons for deterring mur-
der, it might normally be assumed that the Christian's efforts would not violate the non-impo-
sition principle, despite the fact that murder is prohibited by the Ten Commandments. Cf
McGowan, 366 U.S. at 442 (no establishment clause violation for a state for secular reasons to
prohibit conduct, such as murder, which is coincidentally proscribed by the Ten Command-
ments). If the individual Christian, however, found the secular reasons unconvincing and
sought the law solely to implement God's will, he would be imposing his faith.
Subjectivity, on the other hand, may also mean that some actions which appear to be an
imposition of faith in fact are not. Roger Williams's willingness for the state to regulate male
hair length is a case in point. See supra note 89 and accompanying text. One might assume
that this is a clear example of imposition, since those most affected by such a law would proba-
bly have been the Quakers, with whom William had serious doctrinal differences. See W.
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Returning to Professor Greenawalt's example of Jody,1 2 I be-
lieve that Professor Greenawalt would agree that only if Jody could
meet the non-imposition standard would her vote to prohibit the
drinking of alcohol be in accord with good citizenship. 103 Professor
Greenawalt, however, would expect Jody, "given her present insight
into transcendent truth," to follow her religious conviction and vote
for the prohibition even if the standard were not satisfied. 1°4 I agree
with Professor Greenawalt's assessment. Telling Jody that she is not
acting like a good liberal democrat is not likely to change conduct
which she views as compelled by her religious faith. What is needed,
therefore, is a persuasive challenge to Jody's view of transcendent
truth itself, a challenge that I hope to offer through the faith-based
non-imposition principle. By showing Jody, were she a Christian,
that a prohibition vote lacking independently-compelling secular jus-
tification would be incompatible with the faith, I would hope to con-
vince her to refrain from voting.105
As for Professor Greenawalt's illustration of a believer with a
faith-based view weakly supported by rational arguments,"0 6 it should
now be apparent why I would disagree with Professor Greenawalt's
conclusion that the believer should vote his belief. Under the non-
imposition principle, the Christian can properly work to have his po-
sition imposed upon others by law only when he is convinced of the
correctness of his faith-based view on independent, secular
grounds. 107
MILLER, supra note 27, at 186, 191. Williams, however, described "the monstrous haire of
women" upon men's heads as an instance "wherein Civility is wronged." 7 THE COMPLETE
WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 243 (1963). If Williams truly believed that long hair upon
men was detrimental to civil order, a sentiment shared by many American parents in the late
1960s, his approval of state regulation would not violate the non-imposition principle. See W.
MILLER, supra note 27, at 192.
102. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 7 and accompanying text; see also supra note 11.
104. See K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 55.
105. In Jody's case, refraining from voting would be the appropriate method of following
the non-imposition principle. There was presently freedom to drink and it is the prohibitory
law that would have restrained freedom. In settings where an existing law already restrains
freedom, following the principle would require a vote against the law. See infra notes 144-50
and accompanying text. On other occasions, the manner in which a particular issue was
presented could allow a Christian, without contravening the non-imposition principle, to vote
his faith even when independent secular justification did not exist. See supra note 12.
106. See supra notes 10 and 11 and accompanying text.
107. As I have stated, Professor Greenawalt does adopt this principle as the standard of
good citizenship for situations where religious people seek to prohibit conduct solely because it
is viewed as wrong on religious grounds. See supra note 11. For borderline questions of status
and complex factual judgments, however, Professor Greenawalt's good citizenship standard
would not require the person of faith to have independently-compelling secular justification for
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C. Why the Non-Imposition Principle Is an Integral Part of the
Christian Faith
Because I assert that the non-imposition principle is an integral
part of the Christian faith, and therefore should be followed by all
Christians, it is my responsibility explicitly to state why I believe this
to be true. I stated earlier my belief in the Bible as God's infallible
Word.108 While my task would have been simplified had it done so,
the Bible, as a Christian friend has pointed out, nowhere states "Thou
shalt not impose thy faith upon another." As to imposition of beliefs,
however, the Bible speaks as clearly as if it did contain an explicit
proscription, a point seemingly belied by the conduct of some Chris-
tians over the centuries. The Bible is clear that one cannot come to
faith in Jesus without a transformation of the heart through the en-
abling power of the Holy Spirit. '19 That human coercion is no proper
part of this process is vividly shown by the examples of Jesus and the
Apostles, who, rather than using force in spreading the faith, uni-
formly followed the procedure of proclaiming the message, leaving to
the Holy Spirit the role of leading the hearer to acceptance. 10
The question remains whether using law to impose conduct con-
travenes God's will in the same way as imposition of belief. Here, the
examples of Jesus and the Apostles cannot provide the answer, for
Jesus renounced, and the Apostles did not possess, the power to im-
pose conduct through law. Biblical principles, however, while per-
haps not quite so explicitly as with respect to belief, still clearly
mandate the extension of the non-imposition principle to conduct.' 1
his public policy choices. Id. For the reasons to be given in Subpart C, I would apply the
principle across-the-board.
108. See supra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
109. E.g., John 3:3-8; 16:5-11; Rom. 10:9-13. I do not imply by this that rational thought
plays no part in the Christian conversion experience. See K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at
70-71. In fact, I am convinced that a dispassionate evaluation of the evidence relating to the
truth or falsity of Jesus' claims, which undeniably were astonishing, will strongly indicate that
His claims are true. For a classic argument to this effect, dedicated to the legal profession by a
Harvard Law School Professor of Evidence, see S. GREENLEAF, THE TESTIMONY OF THE
EVANGELISTS EXAMINED BY THE RULES OF EVIDENCE ADMINISTERED IN COURTS OF JUS-
TICE (1903). For a more recent popular apologetic work, see J. McDOWELL, MORE THAN A
CARPENTER (1977).
110. See, e.g., John 10:22-30 (Jesus); Acts 2:22-41 (Apostle Peter); 1 Corin. 2:1-5 (Apostle
Paul).
11. I am aware that in stating the issue in this way I invite a much stronger reaction than
if I instead stated that my view is one of a number of permissible Christian responses to the
question I pose. Scriptural authority for this kind of flexibility can be found in the New Testa-
ment discussions of what constituted proper Christian conduct in several areas that were con-
troversial at the time. See Rom. 14 and 1 Cor. 10:23-33. The Apostle Paul did not give an
explicit command from God as to what conduct was allowed and prohibited. Rather, he wrote
[Vol. 9
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The rationale is much the same as that for not attempting to impose
belief. A person could be compelled outwardly to profess faith in
Christ, but, as I have indicated, God would not be interested in such a
"conversion." Similarly, while some standards of godly behavior per-
haps could be compelled through law, the law cannot accomplish
what God principally seeks-a people who freely love Him and
demonstrate their love through obedience.' 12 This attitude, like initial
faith in Christ, can flow only from a transformed heart.
Someone might argue that more godly behavior in itself is a value
that justifies the Christian's reliance upon legal coercion. While
God's ultimate objective may be hearts obedient to His will, as an
intermediate goal He would rather see a person's conduct conform to
His standards, regardless of heart attitude, than see non-conforming
conduct. For example, if the proposed cohabitation proscription
would in fact deter a person from breaking God's principle that re-
stricts sexual activity to the marriage relationship, such a law would
be desirable although God would prefer a person who from faith vol-
untarily obeyed Him.
I am not persuaded. There is no assurance that attempting to
compel godly behavior would result in a net increase in godly behav-
ior. The proposed cohabitation proscription provides a good exam-
ple. Some people would attempt to evade the law, inevitably leading
to lying and deceit. These are also sins before God,1 13 which would
offset the compelled godly behavior of those who would have lived
together but for the law.
The probable psychological effect of the prohibition on those
who did obey also must be considered. I would predict that such a
law would generate great annoyance and hostility at what would be
perceived as an unwarranted interference in one's private affairs. To
the extent that it was known that the law's purpose was to implement
that each believer had the freedom to seek God's will and then act in whatever way his con-
science dictated, so long as one heeded the admonition not to cause believers holding contrary
views to stumble.
I considered whether the appropriateness of extending the non-imposition principle to
conduct should be framed according to the foregoing model of believers' freedom. This model,
however, is governing only for "disputable matters," Rom. 14:1, i.e., those for which disposi-
tive Biblical authority is lacking. My conclusion concerning the reach of the non-imposition
principle is that Scriptural authority, although in some cases indirect, is strong enough to
support the assertion that my position should be accepted as a norm of Christian behavior. I
of course make no claim of infallibility and fully expect that many Christians will disagree with
my views.
112. E.g., John 14:15, 21, 23-24.
113. E.g., Eph. 4:25.
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Christian precepts, these negative feelings would be directed at Chris-
tianity itself. This could only impede God's principal goal of wooing
people's hearts.
Even if with the passage of time the faith-based origins of the
cohabitation proscription were forgotten, so that people would com-
ply without hostility toward Christianity, it is incorrect to think that
this would contribute to a society more righteous before God. Chris-
tianity teaches that each person has sinned and fallen short of the
glory of God, despite the outward "righteousness" of one's con-
duct. 14 The person who wants to live with another outside of mar-
riage, but who refrains from fear of legal sanction, reveals in his heart
an example of the sin that initially separates all of mankind from a
holy God.I15 The heart of the Christian message is that the only way
to righteousness before God is through faith in Jesus Christ, who on
the cross paid the penalty for sin.116 Emphasis upon human law as
the road to righteousness perpetuates a cruel delusion, like the story
of Scrooge at Christmastime. Both direct people's attention to their
own conduct as the avenue to acceptability before God, when in truth
acceptability lies only in trusting Jesus Christ as Savior. Conduct is
important, not as the avenue to God, but as the response of a grateful
heart to God's provision of the only way to Him-Jesus Christ.1"7
A fellow Christian might say that my argument ignores such
events as the great flood in Noah's day 18 and the destruction of
Sodom and Gomorrah in Abraham's. 1'9 Each is an example of God's
judgment against mankind based upon conduct which was abhorrent
to Him. 1 20 Each shows that God in His evaluation of human societies
does draw distinctions based upon conduct alone.
I fully believe that God judges and punishes nations based upon
people's ungodly behavior.1 2 ' This truth, however, does not invali-
114. E.g., Isa. 64:6; Rom. 3:23.
115. See, e.g., Isa. 59:1-8; Matt. 5:27-28, Mark 7:14-23. Even if the law served an educative
purpose, so that a person came to obey it willingly because he believed that the proscribed
conduct in fact was immoral, righteousness before God has not been advanced. Sinful atti-
tudes undoubtedly would remain, if not in the area of the relationship between the sexes
(although I cannot imagine absolute purity here), then in some other area.
116. E.g., John 14:6; Rom. 3:21-26; Gal. 2:15-16, 21.
117. E.g., 1 Pet. 1:14-21.
118. Gen. 6-7.
119. Gen. 18-19.
120. Gen. 6:5, 11-13; 13:13; 18:20-21.
121. Francis Schaeffer describes the circumstances in which God's judgment comes in this
way:
I imagine myself holding a cup which has water dripping into it. The water does not
come quickly, but I keep holding the cup. Gradually the water rises, and at a certain
[Vol. 9
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date the non-imposition principle. There is nothing unusual about
holding someone accountable for an act that you could have pre-
vented or more strongly deterred. As a father, I could put bars on my
children's windows to prevent their leaving the house at night. My
failure to do so does not forfeit my right (and responsibility) to disci-
pline the child who disobeys a rule to stay inside. Similarly, God
holds human societies accountable for ungodly behavior even though
the principle of non-imposition might be said to contribute to an in-
crease in such conduct 12 2 by disallowing the law as a deterrent in situ-
ations where there are no independent, secular grounds for the law.
A final Biblical objection to my view might be asserted based
upon Old Testament passages suggesting that it is God's will that
nonbelievers be coerced into following God's laws regardless of
whether the law can be justified on independent, secular grounds. Le-
viticus 24:16, for example, states that anyone, whether alien or native-
born, who commits blasphemy must be put to death. While it is true
that "alien" most probably refers to those outside the community of
faith,123 reliance on such a passage to support imposition of faith-
based precepts is misplaced. In the first place, no government today
can claim the same relationship with God that Old Testament Israel
enjoyed. I share Roger Williams' belief that it "was unique in the
history of the world and inimitable .... [W]hile God had for a time
placed both His government and His religion on earth in the safekeep-
ing of the people of Israel, He had never again entered into covenant
with any nation. No subsequent government had His sponsorship;
none was authorized to act in His behalf."'
124
In addition to the uniqueness of Old Testament Israel, 2 ' there is
point it flows over the brim. This is the principle of the judgment of God: Man is in
revolt against God, and God waits in longsuffering until every possibility of man's
turning back is exhausted. When the iniquity is full, when the cup overflows, God's
judgment comes.
F. SCHAEFFER, JOSHUA AND THE FLOW OF BIBLICAL HISTORY 66-67 (1976).
122. But see supra note 113 and accompanying text.
123. I rely upon my pastor, who cites F. BROWN, THE NEW BROWN-DRIVER-BRIGGS-
GESENIUS HEBREW AND ENGLISH LEXICON 158 (1978).
124. E. MORGAN, supra note 87, at 93. For a more extended treatment of Williams's view
of the significance of the Old Testament, see Miller, Roger Williams: An Essay in Interpreta-
tion, in 7 THE COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 5-25 (1963).
125. One particularly important manifestation of this uniqueness that is now lacking is the
directness of God's guidance to those who exercise governmental authority. Num. 15:32-36
shows the significance of this difference. There, Moses and the people were unclear as to what
to do with a Sabbath-breaker, despite God's earlier clear command that the penalty was death.
Exod. 31:14-15; 35:2. It was only when "the Lord said to Moses, 'The man must die,'" that
the death sentence was carried out. We have no one like Moses today, a man to whom God
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another significant reason for concluding that the Old Testament does
not today mandate state enforcement of God's laws of behavior.
There are numerous examples in which the Old Testament prescribes
death as the penalty for a particular sin, but the New Testament does
not, either explicitly or implicitly through failure to mention death as
an option.'26 The New Testament passages suggest that while the
conduct proscribed as sinful in the Old Testament is still sinful con-
duct, Christians are no longer to respond to it in the same way. The
most severe worldly penalty which the New Testament describes is to
cut off fellowship with the offender. 127 This is an aspect of church
discipline against sin; 28 it does not invoke the power of the state.'
29
III. DEFENSE OF THE NON-IMPOSITION PRINCIPLE
I anticipate several cogent criticisms of the non-imposition prin-
ciple. Perhaps the most basic objection is that the distinction between
faith-based and secular reasoning will be impossible for Christians to
make, rendering the principle meaningless. Even if such a distinction
were possible in practice, one can argue that it is objectionable to ask
spoke "face to face." Num. 12:8. If even Moses was uncertain as to how to respond, how
could we ever decide what punishment sin qua sin deserves?
126. Compare the following verses: Lev. 20:11 vs. 1 Cor. 5:1-13 (man sleeping with his
father's wife); Exod 31:14-15; 35:2 vs. Luke 6:1-10 (breaking the Sabbath); Lev. 20:9 vs. Eph.
6:1-3 (child-parent relations); Deut. 21:18-21 vs. Luke 15:11-32 (child-parent relations).
127. See 1 Cor. 5:9-13. Verse 13 of this passage is particularly instructive, as it contains the
Old Testament quotation, "Expel the wicked man from among you." The New International
Version translation cites five Old Testament references for the phrase: Deut. 17:7, 19:19;
22:21, 24; and 24:7. All but one use death as the method of expelling the offender. The Apos-
tle Paul gives the phrase the totally new meaning of expulsion from the fellowship.
128. Church discipline of course is pertinent only for church members. They are the only
ones to whom the Apostle Paul commands Christians to deny fellowship. I Corin. 5:9-13.
Christians are still to associate with non-Christians "who are immoral, or the greedy and swin-
dlers, or idolaters." Id. at verse 10. To forbid association would be to require Christians "to
leave this world." Id.
129. Some may argue that Romans 13:1-4 is a clear statement that God has appointed
human governments as His agents to punish all ungodliness:
Everyone must submit himself to the governing authorities, for there is no authority
except that which God has established .... Do you want to be free from fear of the
one in authority? Then do what is right and he will commend you. For he is God's
servant to do you good. But if you do wrong, be afraid, for he does not bear the
sword for nothing. He is God's servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on
the wrongdoer.
The passage does not support the argument suggested. Because it refers to all governing au-
thorities, it necessarily includes authorities which are non-Christian in outlook. A non-Chris-
tian government would have no interest whatever in punishing as a "wrong" those activities,
such as blasphemy of God, which are clearly contrary to God's law but which would not
sufficiently prejudice secular objectives to warrant governmental sanction. It is therefore rea-
sonable to interpret the passage (and the similar passage in 1 Peter 2:13-14) as referring only to
laws which are independently supportable on secular grounds.
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Christians to attempt to make it. A final criticism is that in the con-
text in which I discuss the non-imposition principle-seeking laws
that would implement Christian precepts-the principle is unneces-
sary because such activity does not constitute "imposition" in any
meaningful sense of the word.
A. Christians Cannot Distinguish Between Faith-Based and
Secular Reasoning
Professor Greenawalt argues that the distinction between reli-
gious convictions and rational grounds cannot easily be drawn:
"many believers do not apprehend how the distinct threads of reli-
gious morality fit in the development of their moral and political posi-
tions."' 3 ° On most issues, the believer's opinion is based upon a
combination of "religious convictions" and "ordinary arguments."", 1
In speaking publicly, however, a believer will often cast his arguments
solely in "nonreligious language." 132 Consequently, "[i]dentifying the
special role his religious convictions play would .. .be particularly
difficult .. ".."133 In fact, to expect devout believers to "pluck out
their religious convictions" in order to consider "how they would
think about a critical moral problem if they started from scratch" is
"unrealistic in the sense of impossible ....
I agree with Professor Greenawalt as to the difficulty of distin-
guishing in one's mind between faith-based and secular grounds for
one's opinion. Still, a Christian must try to do so because neither
alternative is acceptable. The first is to withdraw completely from
secular affairs and take no interest whatever in the laws under which
one lives. I do not believe that such extreme detachment from the
world is descriptive of God's plan for all Christians. The other option
is to seek laws heedless of whether or not in particular instances one's
stance can be independently substantiated on secular grounds. Be-
130. K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 43-44.
131. Id. at 44.
132. Id. For Professor Greenawalt's thoughts about the extent to which a believer should
publicly express the religious basis of his political positions, see id. at 215-30. For my own
thoughts on the issue, see Calhoun, Are Religious Arguments Appropriate in Civil Discourse?, 9
CHRISTIAN LEGAL Soc'Y Q. 32 (Fall 1988).
133. K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 44.
134. Id. at 155. Professor Greenawalt's conclusion is puzzling in view of his position,
noted earlier, that the religious person who wants also to be a good liberal democrat must
separate his secular reasoning concerning laws designed to prohibit certain conduct from his
religious conviction that God views the conduct as sinful. See the Sam illustration, supra note
11. If to "pluck out" one's religious conviction in fact is "impossible," how is this separation
to occur?
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cause I believe that the non-imposition principle is an integral part of
the Christian faith, such obliviousness risks disobedience to Christ. 35
Making an effort to comply with the non-imposition principle
does not, of course, ensure success. Here, I would look to the faith,
the source of the obligation, for the resources to fulfill it. This is no
different from how Christians try to obey Christ in other areas. To
love your enemies, 36 for example, certainly is no easier than the de-
mands of the non-imposition principle. Yet just as God provides the
power to give Christians love beyond their human capacities, 37 He
will guide those who earnestly seek to avoid imposing their faith on
others.
Despite a Christian's wholehearted prayerful effort, one still
might say that what the non-imposition principle requires literally is
impossible: however successful a Christian may be in temporarily ex-
cluding conscious religious beliefs from his thinking, assessment of
competing rational arguments inevitably will be significantly influ-
enced by his religious beliefs, even if not consciously. 3  This is un-
doubtedly true. Imposition to me, however, cannot be based on any
subliminal influence of faith. Imposition can occur only when a
Christian is explicitly aware that, despite whatever secular arguments
may favor a law, he supports the measure only because of how God
has spoken concerning the particular issue involved. 39 If the Chris-
tian honestly can say that his faith only confirms what he is confident
he would believe apart from faith, there can be no imposition."
135. If we assume for the moment the validity of my belief about the importance of the
non-imposition principle to Christianity, I believe that Professor Greenawalt would under-
stand my conclusion about the effort required of Christians. In discussing the implications of a
principle which would label reliance upon religious convictions inappropriate for the good
citizen, Professor Greenawalt rejects an exception for people who, because they have never
pondered the matter, are not consciously aware of the ways in which they may be influenced
by their faith:
If reliance on religious convictions is really improper, religious believers should make
at least minimal efforts to identify their place and respond accordingly. Otherwise
unreflective persons could blithely continue to rely on grounds barred to those who
think more seriously. Political principles should not contain such incentives to un-
reflectiveness ....
K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 162; see id. at 38.
136. Matt. 5:44.
137. Romans 5:5.
138. See K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 152-55.
139. As I have indicated, the limitation that there be explicit awareness is not meant to be,
in Professor Greenawalt's phrase, an "incentive to unreflectiveness." The obedient Christian
must actively evaluate his stands on political issues to see if there are any for which his faith is
determinative. See supra notes 135-37 and accompanying text.
140. My test for when an imposition occurs is not as inclusive as Professor Greenawalt's
test for determining when one is relying on religious convictions:
[Vol. 9
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I believe that this standard is workable. The best way to apply it
is for a Christian to attempt to convince a non-Christian of a law's
desirability on rational grounds alone. Consider again a proposed law
to criminalize consensual, heterosexual cohabitation between unmar-
ried adults. During my suggested debate, an honest Christian could
not help but be aware inside whether he found his own arguments
convincing. He would simply know whether "God says sex outside of
marriage is wrong" '141 were the dispositive element in his thinking. If
so, as would be true for me, for the Christian to support the law
would be an imposition of faith, 142 even though the non-Christian
might find convincing the secular arguments that ultimately were un-
persuasive for the Christian.'43
a person is relying on religious convictions if their abandonment would force him
seriously to reconsider the position he takes. If he is now confident of the position he
takes and is uncertain what he would think absent the force of the religious convic-
tions, he is presently relying on those convictions to a degree, even though it is possi-
ble that he would eventually arrive at the same conclusion without them.
K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 37. For Professor Greenawalt, being forced "seriously to
reconsider" a position is the key. I look not at the mere fact of a reevaluation, but at its
aftermath. If the Christian, following a reconsideration from which God's perspective tempo-
rarily is excluded, concludes in good faith that his opinion does not change, no imposition can
occur.
141. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
142. I discussed earlier Professor Greenawalt's conclusion that a religious person would
not be acting as a good liberal democrat if he sought to prohibit acts solely because his faith
compelled him to view them as morally wrong. See supra note 11. Professor Greenawalt does
suggest, however, that a belief in sinfulness might generate a secular, paternalistic justification
for a prohibition if the believer were convinced on religious grounds, despite the lack of com-
pelling factual evidence, that living in sin would produce unhappiness and psychological mal-
adjustments. K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 91-92. I would not consider this a secular
argument. It is not that the believer's conclusion, were he a Christian, is wrong. Living con-
trary to God's law will inevitably be harmful for anyone, believer and nonbeliever. Professor
Norman Anderson is correct when he writes that God's "moral precepts and laws must.., be
regarded as our Maker's instructions for the human creatures he has brought into being, and
only in so far as they obey these instructions will they be able to fulfil his beneficent purposes
and enjoy the full, happy and satisfying lives which He intended them to live." Anderson,
Public Law and Legislation, in LAW, MORALITY AND THE BIBLE 235 (B. Kaye & G. Wenham
eds. 1978). This is true regardless of whether evidence can be produced. Without substantiat-
ing evidence, however, the believer's faith would be the only thing leading him to attribute
negative worldly consequences to certain behavior. Relying solely on this faith-based view to
justify a prohibitory law would be no more secular than relying upon a desire to help protect
nonbelievers from God's judgment after death. (This desire, while commendable, would be
misdirected to the extent it expressed itself in laws requiring righteous behavior. See supra
notes 114-17 and accompanying text). Even if persuasive evidence were produced, of course, a
Christian might still conclude that the benefits of the law were outweighed by its
disadvantages.
143. The key point to avoid an imposition is that the Christian actually be convinced him-
self by the secular arguments. The mere fact that secular arguments can be made which are
convincing to others is not sufficient. Cf. Zimmerman, To Walk a Crooked Path: Separating
Law and Religion in the Secular State, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1095, 1102 (1986) (no viola-
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Two events from my life provide additional support for my belief
that a Christian has the ability to distinguish between faith-based and
secular reasoning. The first involves my experience in deciding how
to vote on a community referendum to determine whether or not to
continue enforcing Sunday "Blue Laws."" I believed that God had
spoken on the sacredness of the Sabbath.'45 If I were a merchant, I
knew that I would not open my business on Sunday.'46 I believed that
Christians and non-Christians alike who dishonored the Sabbath were
disobeying God, but should this mean a vote to require their obedi-
ence? At the time of the vote, I had not fully articulated my standard
of non-imposition. I did believe, though, that prohibiting someone
from working on Sunday would not promote true obedience to God,
which must come from a heart submissive to His will. While this
would clearly seem to have indicated a vote against the law, I was
bewildered as to what to do. On the one hand, I did not want to force
people to go through the motions of observing the Sabbath. On the
other hand, I was concerned that repeal of the law would result in
Christian employees, who might otherwise have observed the Sab-
bath, being forced to work. I finally decided that my protective im-
pulses toward other Christians did not justify a vote to continue the
law. 147 The Bible is clear that being obedient as a Christian will entail
a cost.148 A vote to impose my beliefs on others was too high a price
tion of the establishment clause if religious individuals support laws in part for religious rea-
sons, but also because they believe the laws are "justified convincingly on independent,
objective grounds."); Cuomo, supra note 25, at 16-17 (free exercise clause protects the right of
a believer to propose the implementation of his religious beliefs through law, not for "parochial
or narrowly sectarian" reasons, but because he believes the proposal benefits all citizens by
fulfilling "a human desire for order, peace, justice, kindness, love or any of the values most of
us agree are desirable even apart from their specific religious base or context."). Of course, if
the non-Christian is not persuaded by the secular arguments and energetically argues the other
side, the discussion will help the Christian in his evaluation of the degree to which his opinion
on an issue is premised in his faith. It would not be uncommon for a debate to expose as faith-
based an opinion that the Christian formerly thought was secularly-based. I therefore view the
debate process as an important resource for a Christian seriously interested in complying with
the non-imposition principle.
144. I mentioned earlier McGowan, 366 U.S. 420, which upheld the constitutionality of
Sunday "Blue Laws." See supra note 66. It should be apparent that as the non-imposition
principle has its source in the faith itself, a Christian is not released from the responsibility of
applying it by a Supreme Court finding that a particular law is constitutional. The non-imposi-
tion principle operates independently of the Constitution as a constraint on the freedom of
Christians to seek implementation of faith-based precepts through law.
145. E.g., Exod. 20:8-11.
146. I realize that the fact that I am not a merchant makes reaching this conclusion much
easier.
147. My decision was reached only after many conversations with friends, both Christian
and non-Christian, in which I openly discussed my struggle.
148. Eg., Luke 14:25-35; 2 Tim. 3:12.
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for preventing some Christians from being brought to a test of faith.
I am glad that I voted as I did. In retrospect, I believe that the
vote was consistent with the standard of non-imposition. Non-faith
reasons certainly exist for making Sunday a day of rest: "a day which
all members of the family and community have the opportunity to
spend and enjoy together, a day on which there exists relative quiet
and disassociation from the everyday intensity of commercial activi-
ties ... "I49 For me, though, such reasons, of which I was aware at
the time of the referendum, did not supplant the feeling that my vote
for the law would have been primarily motivated by my desire to see
God's teachings concerning the Sabbath be obeyed. Fellow believers
who in good faith independently based their vote to enforce the "Blue
Laws" on secular grounds did not violate the non-imposition
principle. 
150
The second personal experience that I offer as support for the
workability of the non-imposition standard is my thinking concerning
the abortion controversy. The pivotal question in the debate, requir-
ing an inquiry into the status of the fetus, is whether abortion is the
equivalent of taking a human life. Such an inquiry, swirling around
such issues as whether potential human life equals human life, the
significance of advances in medical technology and whether a fetus
experiences pain from abortion, generally ends in "an unproductive
impasse."151 How wonderful it would be if suddenly some new infor-
mation could be interjected into the debate that would definitively an-
149. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 450. As to secular reasons for why Sunday should be this day
of rest, rather than some other day, the Court relied on "common knowledge that [Sunday]
has come to have special significance as a rest day in this country . . . . [I]t would seem
unrealistic for enforcement purposes and perhaps detrimental to the general welfare ... to
choose a common day of rest other than that which most persons would select of their own
accord." Id. at 451-52. See Greenawalt, The Limits of Rationality and the Place of Religious
Convictions: Protecting Animals and the Environment, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1011, 1020
n.28 (1986).
150. Thus, finally to answer the question whether the evangelicals in the 1786 Virginia
Assembly who voted to enforce "Blue Laws" (see supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text)
were imposing their faith, one would have to have more specific information about their moti-
vation. My strong suspicion is that they did not support the law on independent, secular
grounds. The statute's title, for example, was "A Bill for Punishing Disturbers of Religious
Worship and Sabbath Breakers." McGowan 366 U.S. at 494 n.68 (separate opinion of Justice
Frankfurter). Although the Court in McGowan discounted similar statutory language in find-
ing Maryland's "Blue Laws" to be constitutional, it relied upon other evidence which sug-
gested that the current purpose of the laws was viewed as secular. 366 U.S. at 445-49. In
Virginia in 1786 I am convinced that the "Blue Laws" essentially were viewed as a religious
measure. See W. MILLER, supra note 27, at 49; T. BUCKLEY, supra note 27, at 181-82.
151. Rhoden, The New Neonatal Dilemma: Live Births from Late Abortions, 72 GEO. L.J.
1451, 1467 (1984).
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swer the question of how the unborn should be viewed. I believe that
such information is at hand: the revelation from God through Scrip-
ture that from conception He views the unborn as human life.152 I
recognize, of course, that not everyone agrees with my view of what
God has said. 153 For me, though, He has spoken in a way that aligns
me with those who want to see legal protection for the lives of the
unborn. The issue thus becomes whether I should refrain from seek-
ing such laws because my viewing the unborn as human life is based
upon my religious faith.
One might expect that at this point I would apply the non-impo-
sition principle. I shall do so shortly, but first I must reveal a part of
my personal history that is relevant to the question of whether in my
opposition to abortion I am attempting to impose my faith on others.
My initial misgivings about abortion arose from an experience that
occurred shortly after my wife became pregnant with our first child.
This was at a time in my life when I was in the midst of an extended
"falling away" from the Christian commitment of my youth. As part
of our preparation for parenthood, we bought the book, A Child Is
Born.154 The book contains remarkable photographs of life before
birth; it allowed us to follow the growth of our unborn baby. We
were amazed at how quickly development occurs. As amazing to us,
however, was our emotional response as parents. From the very first,
we began to refer to our coming child by name and to discuss him as
if he were alive and already with us. We also spontaneously began
seriously to entertain the view that abortion, regardless of the fetus's
stage of development, was the equivalent of taking a human life.
These feelings arose unbidden and were, at least for me, in no con-
scious way connected with how God might view the unborn, a matter
in which I then was not interested.1 55
My experience convinces me that one can view an unborn child
152. E.g., Job 10:8-12; Psalm 139:13-16.
153. Some might not believe in God at all, some might believe in Him but reject the notion
that He has spoken through the Bible, and some might accept the Bible as God's Word but
disagree with my interpretation.
154. L. NILSSON, M. FURUHJELM, A. INGLEMAN-SUNDBERG, & C. WIRStN, A CHILD IS
BORN (1977).
155. Professor Greenawalt would describe my nonreligious feeling about the unborn child
as an example of a personal basis of decision. Such bases "cannot be justified, in the force they
are given, in terms of publicly accessible reasons. These bases would include personal percep-
tions, intuitions, feelings, and commitments, and deferences to the judgments of others that
cannot be defended by persuasive reasons of interpersonal force .... " K. GREENAWALT,
supra note 2, at 156. In applying his standard of the good citizen, Professor Greenawalt argues
that there is no reason to allow reliance on personal bases of decision while disallowing reli-
ance on religious convictions. Id. at 156-60.
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as a human life from conception apart from religious faith. Because
my Christian commitment has now been rekindled, however, this ear-
lier episode does not free me from applying the non-imposition stan-
dard to my activist pro-life position. 15 6 The question is whether the
initial non-faith grounding of my misgivings about abortion has been
supplanted by a faith-based firm opposition, branding any work to
implement my views through law as violative of the non-imposition
principle. The answer is "no," because there are additional compel-
ling non-faith reasons that independently convince me that the un-
born child from conception should be treated as a human life.157 In
several talks on abortion to secular audiences, I have tried to persuade
them of this fact using only secular arguments. On these occasions, I
have not had in the back of my mind the thought that "the only rea-
son I really feel as I do is that God says so." Rather, I myself find the
secular arguments compelling on their own merit. Seeking laws that
reflect my views therefore does not violate the non-imposition
principle.158
B. It Is Objectionable to Ask Christians to Distinguish Between
Faith-Based and Secular Reasoning
Assuming that it is possible for Christians to distinguish between
faith-based and secular reasoning, Professor Greenawalt argues that it
would be "positively objectionable" to ask them to do so. 1 5 9 To ask
156. As I have previously shown, since abortion involves a borderline question of status,
Professor Greenawalt would not require the religious person desiring to be as well a good
liberal democrat to have self-sustaining secular reasons for his stand on abortion. See supra
notes 11 and 107 and accompanying text. Since I, however, view the non-imposition principle
as required by the Christian faith, I cannot selectively apply it depending upon the type of
issue. I must struggle to live consistently with the faith regardless of the circumstances.
157. Since this article is not primarily concerned with the merits of the abortion contro-
versy, I will not detail those reasons here. I will, however, mention three of the most signifi-
cant: (1) the fact that late second-trimester abortions sometimes result in live births [see
Rhoden, supra note 151, at 1452-53 and 1458-59]; (2) the substantial evidence that as early as
the end of the first trimester fetuses experience pain during abortions [see COLLINS, MARZEN
& ZIELINSKI, FETAL PAIN AND ABORTION: THE MEDICAL EVIDENCE, (Pamphlet No. 18,
Law and Medicine Series, Legal Defense Fund of Americans United for Life (1984))]; and (3)
the "experimentally demonstrated fact" that from conception the human embryo is genetically
unique [see the testimony of Professor Jerome Lejeune in the "frozen human embryo" case,
Davis v. Davis, 1989 WL 140495 (Tenn. Cir., Sept. 21, 1989), rev'd, 1990 WL 130807 (Tenn.
App., Sept. 13, 1990), aff'd, 1992 WL 115574 (Tenn., June 1, 1992). For a complete discus-
sion of why I believe that fetal personhood should be recognized from conception, see Calhoun
& Sexton, Is It Possible to Take Both Fetal Life and Women Seriously? Professor Laurence
Tribe and His Reviewers, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 437, 453-63 (1992).
158. See supra notes 140-43 and accompanying text.
159. K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 155.
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religious persons to "pluck out their religious convictions"'" and take
a "fresh look"'' demands that they "compartmentalize beliefs that
constitute some kind of unity in their approach to life .... 162 This
would result in "a frustrating alienation of their whole persons from
their political characters."'
' 63
While I appreciate Professor Greenawalt's solicitude for those
with religious faith, I am not unwilling to ask Christians to take a
"fresh look." This is not a demand to compromise a unified approach
to life. A Christian's chief goal is to submit to the Lordship of Jesus
Christ in every area.' 64 Because the non-imposition principle is an
integral part of Christianity, striving to apply it, not ignoring it, is the
only course consistent with the overarching objective of obedience.
The principle does not even ask the Christian to compromise a
unified approach in forming his opinions on a particular issue. The
proposed heterosexual cohabitation proscription discussed earlier
may be used to illustrate the point. Assume a Christian who, while
acknowledging the existence of some secular arguments for such a
law, 65 concludes that countervailing secular reasons would make the
law unwise.' 66 Rejecting a prohibitory law does not mean that the
Christian believes that it would be right for a couple to live together
outside of marriage. In fact, for the obedient Christian, the clear Bib-
lical ban of such activity 167 compels the conclusion that it would be
wrong, even if the Christian does not fully understand why God
speaks in this way and even though the Christian may see much to
recommend the practice. The Christian's opinion ultimately is con-
formed to God's Word, the final arbiter.
16
But will the Christian who refrains from seeking a law to compel
godly behavior experience that "frustrating alienation" of his "whole
person" from his "political character" that Professor Greenawalt
fears? I think not. Obedient Christians do not feel frustrated by the
160. Id.
161. Greenawalt, Religious Convictions and Lawmaking, 84 MIcH. L. REV. 352, 380
(1980).
162. Id.; K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 155.
163. K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 258.
164. E.g., Luke 6:46; Galat. 2:20.
165. See supra note 98.
166. These would include the costs of enforcement both in terms of money and invasions of
privacy.
167. See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
168. Men and women, as creations of God, should humbly submit to the "Maker's instruc-
tions." See supra note 142. When the attributes of mankind are compared to those of God (see
supra notes 13-19 and accompanying text), it would be startling if we could fully understand
all that God has said. See Rom. 11:33-36.
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fact that they do not use law in an attempt to force people to believe
the claims of Jesus. Rather, Christians willingly submit to the Bible's
teaching that force would be unavailing and instead strive to follow
noncoercive Biblical examples in bearing witness to their faith.169 In
the same way, forbearing to resort to law to coerce godly conduct
reflects the obedient Christian's recognition that it is impossible to
compel what the Bible teaches is God's chief desire-hearts freely
submissive to His standards. 170 Renouncing force prevents frustra-
tion by keeping Christians from attempting the impossible and instead
directs attention to the many appropriate ways in which they may
effectively work to accomplish what God seeks. 17 Forbearance to use
law will also yield the peace that comes from following God's will.
Another possible objection to asking Christians to give laws a
"fresh look" independent of their religious convictions is that it is
unfair to do so. As Professor Greenawalt points out, there are many
decisions for which the usefulness of rational "interpersonal argument
is decidedly limited ... on the critical questions one must resort to
one's own personal sense of life and a reflective view that makes one
comfortable." '172 This description includes people with no religious
faith. Yet, if one sought a reaction to the phrase "imposition of val-
ues" from members of the public, I suspect that their common as-
sumption would be that the values being referred to were religious
values. 7 3 Imposition of nonreligious values has not aroused nearly
the same level of general concern. 174 Most would not think of saying
to the nonreligious person: "Before seeking a particular law, you
must decide if you can justify the law on rational grounds alone,
stripped of the ultimate values to which you normally resort to guide
your actions." Can it be fair then to require such a process for
Christians?
175
One response to this fairness objection is to argue that people
without religious faith should attempt to objectify their thinking
169. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. For other problems arising from the at-
tempt to coerce godliness, see supra notes 113-17 and accompanying text.
171. See, e.g., infra notes 180-83 and accompanying text.
172. K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 109-10. See id. at 112-13, 136-37.
173. A current example is the abortion controversy. See id. at 120-21.
174. Some, though, have expressed grave concern over nonreligious values being imposed
under the rubric of "values neutrality." E.g., Horn, "World Views" and Public Policy, in
WHOSE VALUES? 167-68 (C. Horn ed. 1985).
175. See K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 144, 176.
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about law to the extent possible. 176 Even if this argument were ac-
cepted as valid, 177 the fact that the nonreligious never made the effort
would not release Christians of their obligation to try. The source of
the Christian's obligation is Jesus Christ, not some notion of reciproc-
ity with those who do not share the faith. Any fairness objection,
therefore, is for me not persuasive.
C. Seeking Laws That Would Implement Christian Precepts Does
Not Constitute Imposition
The "imposition" to which my non-imposition principle has con-
sistently referred has been that of a Christian's seeking laws that
would compel others to abide by Christian precepts. A good argu-
ment can be made, however, that even an individual Christian's fer-
vent effort to seek enactment of a law that for him has solely a faith-
based justification would not constitute any imposition worth talking
about. The individual Christian voter is a far cry from a Christian
dictator with the power to coerce at least the outward form of a
Christian lifestyle. In fact, the typical individual's impact in our com-
plicated political process accurately can be described as infinitesimal.
To call such individual activity an imposition of faith is a gross
distortion.
One response to this critique is to point out that the United
States has thousands of Christians who, if they act in concert, can
achieve a greater likelihood of significant impact on the law.178 I,
176. Professor Greenawalt believes that there are several modem theorists who take this
position. Id. at 49-56, 156.
177. Professor Greenawalt's basic position is that this effort is not required by his standard
of good citizenship. See id. at 109-10, 112-13, 136-37. He does, however, recognize some
exceptions. For example, one should not seek to prohibit conduct merely because one views it
as wrong based upon nonreligious moral values. Id. at 94-95. Cf supra note 11 (discusses the
same limitation for those with religious values).
178. Professor James Hitchcock argues that even concerted action by religious believers
would not be inconsistent with American pluralism. Pluralism is not
a system in which diverse groups voluntarily refrain from pushing their own views
too hard, least they tread on the toes of their neighbors.
In reality, pluralism is precisely the opposite. It is of the essence of a pluralistic
society that, since there is no commonly accepted standard for what is true or false,
every group must push as hard as it can for its own positions. Limits are imposed on
this only by other groups pushing equally hard in the other direction.
Hitchcock, Disentangling the Secular Humanism Debate, in WHOSE VALUES? 21, 34-35 (C.
Horn ed. 1985). Professor Greenawalt would reject this as an appropriate model for a liberal
democracy, which should be more than "a set of procedures for making political decisions
... "1 K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 11. Rather, the premises of liberal democracy
include limitations on what political outcomes are acceptable as well as on what reasons are
permissible for supporting acceptable outcomes. Id. I disagree with Professor Hitchcock's
[Vol. 9
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however, do not rely on this approach, which makes the existence of
an imposition dependent upon the practicalities of implementation.
For me, the determinative factor is intent, the individual Christian's
objective in voting for a particular law. If the goal is to implement a
faith-based concept that lacks independent secular justification, the
Christian has violated the non-imposition principle. The motivation
is what matters, not the probable outcome. 17 9
Some may argue that a Christian who attempts to follow my con-
cept of non-imposition will be constrained in ways antithetical to the
faith. Christ called his followers to be His witnesses to the ends of the
earth. 180 A Christian cannot obey if he is burdened by my overinclu-
sive notion of imposition. Moreover, general application of my prin-
ciple in effect would bar the Christian world view from the
marketplace of ideas, leaving a vacuum to be filled by those who do
not share the faith.
The foregoing critique, if valid, would force me to abandon the
non-imposition principle.1 8 1 I fully agree that Christians are called to
be Christ's witnesses. The non-imposition principle, however, is not
an impediment to this obligation. The principle does not ask the
Christian to forego all involvement in the legal process. It would only
disable the Christian from seeking laws which for him have no inde-
pendently-compelling secular justification.
182
model for a different reason: to the extent that a Christian's "pushing hard" violates the non-
imposition principle, it is incompatible with the faith.
179. Some may be perplexed by this conclusion in view of one of my reasons for believing
that the non-imposition principle should be extended to conduct: the likelihood that forced
compliance with Christian precepts would generate hostility toward Christianity. See supra
text following note 113. If there is no likelihood of success in passing such a law, the argument
seemingly loses its punch. I believe, though, that significant hostility may be generated against
a religious faith by efforts to impose that faith's lifestyle even when those efforts have no
chance of success. Imagine, for example, how Christians would react if adherents of the New
Age movement worked for a law to compel people to wear crystals. Even if one could envision
circumstances in which no hostility would be generated, the non-imposition principle is sup-
ported by other significant arguments. See supra notes 114-29 and accompanying text.
180. Acts 1:8.
181. If following the non-imposition principle precluded a Christian's being a witness for
Christ, it would necessarily mean that in my earlier Biblical arguments in support of the prin-
ciple that I had misinterpreted Scripture. The Bible, as God's infallible Word, does not subject
Christians to contradictory commands.
182. The disability does not operate at all to constrain opposition to laws attempting to
compel Christians to act in ways contrary to the faith. Faith-based civil disobedience clearly is
a Biblical concept. See, e.g., Dan. 6 and Acts 4:18-20. If society by law attempted to compel
me to act contrary to Christianity, I would not comply-even if there were absolutely no
secular justification for my refusal. The non-imposition principle is not to the contrary. It
does not deal with state attempts to compel Christians to act inconsistently with the faith, but
with attempts by Christians to enlist state aid to compel everyone (non-Christians too) to act
consistently with the faith.
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Even when a Christian cannot in good faith find independent sec-
ular justification for a law, there need be no vacuum. For a moment,
return to the proposed law to criminalize consensual cohabitation be-
tween heterosexual, unmarried adults. If, consistently with the non-
imposition principle, I refrain from supporting the law, it does not
mean that I must refrain from being a witness for Christ. I can make
sure that my own conduct comports with God's view of the sacred-
ness of marriage. In my relationships with my friends, as God leads
me, I can with sensitivity communicate His standards of righteous
behavior. I can participate in and support the teaching of God's prin-
ciples in appropriate settings. Finally, and this cannot be overstated, I
can examine my life to be certain that I am obeying Christ's commis-
sion to make disciples of all nations,1 83 especially the friends and ac-
quaintances whom God has brought into my life. The only truly
effective way to promote obedience to the way of life that God
prescribes is to be used of God to draw to Himself a people who will
voluntarily strive to obey out of love and gratitude.
IV. CONCLUSION
In this article I have articulated a faith-based non-imposition
principle and defended it against anticipated criticisms. I wish that I
could conclude here. Unfortunately, I must reveal some personal
misgivings about the principle caused by a letter from a Christian
friend. The letter, referring to my friend's perspective on the abortion
controversy, reads as follows:
I don't think I can separate the religious grounds for my belief that
a fetus is a human life from the nonreligious. In fact, notwith-
standing my majoring in biology, it was not until as a young Chris-
tian in college I considered Scripture and spoke with several
Christian brothers that I became persuaded of the truth of the mat-
ter. The orthodox Christian view on abortion makes sense to me
not because of biology, but because of what God's view is as re-
vealed in Scripture. But for God's perspective (as in all things), the
balancing of interests, the mother's, fetus's, society's, etc., seems to
me a fairly reasonable approach. It is His perspective that makes
the difference ultimately.'
The letter is not disturbing due to its statement that my friend
cannot distinguish between the religious and nonreligious grounds for
his belief that a fetus is a human life. The excerpt shows that he, in
183. Mat. 28:18-20.
184. The letter is in my possession and is used with my friend's permission.
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fact, could make the distinction, and that a faith-based reason was
dispositive in the formation of his anti-abortion opinion. What trou-
bles me is the effect of applying the non-imposition principle to my
friend's situation. Because he plainly states that secular reasons
alone were insufficient to ground his pro-life view, to act consistently
with my theory I must tell him that it would be inappropriate, for
faith-based reasons, for him to seek laws to implement his position. I
must do so despite the fact that for me such activity would be permis-
sible due to the independent, secular grounding of my view that the
unborn constitute human life. 85 This is deeply troubling advice to
give, because it asks my friend to refrain from seeking laws to prevent
the taking of what his faith compels him to view as defenseless human
life.
The classic response when a carefully-constructed theory threat-
ens to fall apart is for the author to twist and squirm to find an escape
hatch. There are possibilities. One is to argue that my friend appro-
priately could disregard the non-imposition principle here because to
proscribe the taking of human life has clear secular justification.
Faith was used only to include the fetus within the definition of
human life.186 Without the conclusion that human life is present in
the womb, however, there can be no recourse to the secular reasons
for protecting it. Because this conclusion for my friend in the final
analysis was faith-based, I must conclude that the non-imposition
principle is still applicable. 87
Another possible escape is to argue that while the non-imposition
principle is important, it properly can be overridden if the stakes are
high enough. Freely allowing abortions has resulted in the deaths of
millions of unborn human beings. Curtailing the procedure is impera-
tive if one is to obey God, who commands, "[riescue those being led
away to death; hold back those staggering toward slaughter." '
While this "emergency exception" approach is appealing, particularly
185. See supra notes 156-58 and accompanying text.
186. This argument is in essence the basis of Professor Greenawalt's conclusion "that reli-
ance on religious convictions to oppose permissive abortion laws" does not violate "the princi-
ple of liberalism that the religious convictions of one segment of society should not be imposed
on the rest." K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 168.
187. Since my friend's evaluation of the secular evidence during his college days, many
additional secular arguments have appeared which further substantiate the position that the
fetus should be viewed as a human life. If my friend could be convinced now that secular
reasons alone justify this perspective, the non-imposition principle would not bar his recourse
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for the abortion question, I cannot accept it. Recognizing the excep-
tion would throw the doors wide open. Different Christians could, on
faith-based grounds, believe that an emergency existed in any number
of different situations. To justify imposition of faith in each instance
is obviously to render the non-imposition principle meaningless. Be-
cause I believe the principle itself to be an integral part of the Chris-
tian faith, I am unwilling to see this happen.
But can I seriously mean that my Christian friend should stand
idly by when he believes that unborn children are being killed? What
about God's command to save those about to die? There are many
avenues of action still available for the Christian for whom recourse
to the law is unavailable due to the non-imposition principle.1 89 In
my earlier discussion of the proposed cohabitation proscription, I
mentioned four types of non-legal involvement: (1) personal exam-
ple, (2) individual counsel to friends, (3) teaching, and (4) evangel-
ism. 19° All of these methods could appropriately be followed in the
abortion setting.1 91 In addition, the Christian should support efforts
to prevent unwanted pregnancy. Included should be an emphasis on
God's principle that confines sexual intercourse to the marriage rela-
tionship. Finally, the Christian should reach out with God's love to
women faced with the decision of whether to abort. It is not enough
to say to them, "[a]bortion is the taking of human life. Do not do it.
Best of luck with your pregnancy and your life." Rather, realistic
alternatives to abortion must be provided.
19 2
The non-legal steps that I have outlined are difficult. They call
for sustained commitment and sacrifice by Christian people. As an
189. It might be suggested that it is indefensible for the non-imposition principle to over-
ride God's clear command to rescue the dying. That command, however, surely is subject to
the implicit limitation that the methods of rescue chosen be consistent with the faith. I, for
example, share the view of many Christians who believe that the faith does not countenance
violence in the fight against abortion. I submit that the non-imposition principle is another
constraint on the manner in which the obedient Christian responds to God's command.
190. See supra text accompanying note 183.
191. Personal example would include not just refraining from having an abortion oneself,
but also one's response in situations where abortion may suggest itself as the easiest way out of
a difficult situation. Christian parents, for example, must be willing to stand by their seven-
teen-year old daughter through her unwanted pregnancy rather than seeking a secret abortion
to avoid a scandal.
By including evangelism, I do not imply that one who disagrees with my position on
abortion cannot be a Christian. I do believe, however, that Christians who support permissive
abortion laws either have misread Scripture or do not give Scripture the central importance in
their lives that God commands.
192. One positive result of the abortion controversy has been the mobilization of many fine
Christian organizations to do this very thing. If the abortion laws are ever made more restric-
tive, the demand on these groups could well increase dramatically.
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avoidance measure, we may be tempted to deceive ourselves into
thinking that the law alone is the answer to the abortion tragedy.
Laws severely restricting abortion would help by reducing the number
of abortions, 193 but it is foolish to think that a change in the law
would cause abortion simply to disappear. In an important sense,
then, it would be beneficial for many Christians to feel constrained by
the non-imposition principle to forego law as a way to combat abor-
tion. Such Christians would serve to keep all of those committed to
protecting the unborn honest about the magnitude of the task.
My conclusions about what can realistically be expected of law
by those who oppose abortion apply more generally to Christians who
desire to see God's standards followed in other areas. To the extent
that a law can reflect God-spoken precepts without violating the non-
imposition principle, I would not oppose using the law to accomplish
its independent, secular objectives. If the goal, however, is a society
more righteous before God, recourse to law is futile. There is no sub-
stitute for Christian people who through their words and lives pro-
claim God's truth and love to the world. The only hope for a society
more righteous before God is God's own power at work in the human
heart, not man's power as applied through law.
193. See K. GREENAWALT, supra note 2, at 124.
289]
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